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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti, displacing
one-third of the country's population.' In the aftermath of the quake,
it became clear that current disaster response policy is inadequate to
address mass population displacement in the wake of natural disaster. 2
Haitians affected by the earthquake represent a small number of the
globe's displaced population. In 2009, prior to the earthquake in
Haiti, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
reported that there were more than 27 million internally displaced
people worldwide. 3 With natural disasters--capable of displacing
1. Arthur McQueen, SOUTHCOM Chief Praises Haiti Quake Response, AIR
13, 2011), http://www.af.mil/news/
FORCE PRINT NEWS TODAY (Jan.
storyprint.asp?id=123238241.
2. See INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI & THE LAMP FOR
HAITI FOUNDATION, ONE YEAR AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE - HAITIANS STILL LIVING
IN CRISIS (2011), available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/
01/Camp-ConditionsFinal.pdf [hereinafter ONE YEAR]; THE LAMP FOR HAITI
FOUNDATION ET AL., "WE'VE BEEN FORGOTTEN": CONDITIONS IN HAITI'S
DISPLACEMENT CAMPS EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE (2010), available
http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/IDP-Report-09.23.10at
compressed.pdf [hereinafter EIGHT MONTHS]; THE LAMP FOR HAITI FOUNDATION
ET AL., NEGLECT IN THE ENCAMPMENTS: HAITI'S SECOND-WAVE HUMANITARIAN
at
http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wpavailable
(Mar.
2010),
DISASTER
[hereinafter
content/uploads/2010/03/Neglect-in-the-Encampments-FINAL.pdf
NEGLECT].

3. Working with the Internally Displaced, UNHCR (2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4cd917fb9.html;

see infra Part 3.A.iv for a definition and
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thousands-on the rise, the need to address the rights of those
displaced has become of critical concern to the United Nations.4 in
fact, "[p]eople displaced within their own country ... now form the
largest population of concern to the United States High Commissioner
for Refugees." 5
The events following the earthquake in Haiti validate the United
Nations' concern regarding internally displaced populations in the
wake of a natural disaster. 6 Though the earthquake was not the sole
source of displacement in Haiti, as the majority of people suffered
from substandard living conditions even before it, the earthquake has
increased the size of Haiti's displaced population and further
threatened displaced Haitians' rights to health, vote, and security.'
This warrants concern, as a denial of these rights perpetuates
immobility, animosity, and distrust, all things that impede efforts to
reconstruct a better Haiti.' This comment suggests a new policy
approach toward managing and coordinating relief efforts both from
the outset and in the wake of natural disasters. The goal of this new
approach is to prevent other natural disasters from reaching the same
level of humanitarian crisis as did the disaster in Haiti.
Although the response efforts in Haiti were well-intentioned, the
methods taken were not appropriate for a country in such a state of
disaster and, in some cases, exacerbated the situation. For example,
aid was kept unused at the airport for days; 9 rows of toilets in certain
description of internally displaced people.
4. See OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION

OF HUMANITARIAN AFF. (OCHA),
HANDBOOK FOR APPLYING THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT,

(1999),
available at
http://www.the-ecentre.net/resources/elibrary/
i-iii
doc/HanbooklDP.pdf [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
5. Id. at 48. The earthquake in Haiti increased this population by more than a
million people. Id.
6. See Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: A
available at
(Aug.
14,
2009),
UNHCR
Perspective, UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a8e4f8b2.html.
7. Deborah Sontag, DespairGrows on Devastated Street in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/americas/28haiti.html.
8. See id.
9. Dr. Catherine Maternowska, Co-founder of Lambi Fund of Haiti, Address at
the University of California Los Angeles Fowler Museum's Conference: Haiti
Stories / Istwa Ayiti (Jan. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Maternowska]. During the post-
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displacement camps were placed next to the trash receptacles, which
were adjacent to water distribution and mobile clinic sites;'o and
hundreds of people were confined into areas filled with plastic tentsareas which not only provided a breeding ground for bacterial disease,
but provided safe harbors throughout the country's capital, Port-auPrince, for many of the 4,000 prisoners who escaped from the
Further, numerous nongovernmental
National Penitentiary."
organizations (NGOs) arrived and set up operations in Port-au-Prince,
an already highly congested urban area, but also one that would afford
them the opportunity to gain media exposure.' 2
Unfortunately, no efforts were made to either decentralize the
displaced population or to help individuals who voluntarily fled from
Port-au-Prince to less affected, more rural areas." Rather than taking
advantage of natural migration patterns of the Haitians who fled Portau-Prince to the countryside to reunite with family members,' 4
agencies disbursed aid in Port-au-Prince, a city that was already
densely populated prior to the earthquake, cluttered with dead bodies
and rubble, and filled with panic. 15 More efficient rubble removal and
earthquake recovery, Dr. Maternowska worked in the field and served as the point
person for Violence Against Children. Id.
10. MARK SCHULLER, UNSTABLE FOUNDATIONS: IMPACT OF NGOs ON HUMAN
RIGHTS FOR PORT-AU-PRINCE'S INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE 11 (Oct. 4, 2010),

available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Report-unstablefoundations-final-2.pdf.
11. Frontline: Battle for Haiti, PBS (Jan. 11, 2011), http://video.pbs.org/
video/1737171448/#result [hereinafter Frontline] ("On January 12, 2010, the jails
broke open, all of the hardcore gang leaders escaped ..... The tent camps
represented virgin territory for the gangs to go and conquer.").
12. SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 19, 32-33.
13. See generally NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 21-27 (revealing how the location
of the camp plays a role in the receipt of aid. For example, while Champ-de-Mars, a
camp in Port-au-Prince received water, Bouzi, a camp located outside of Port-auPrince, did not receive any water from aid organizations).
14. Christopher Joyce, Cellphones Could Help Doctors Stay Ahead of An
Epidemic,

NPR's

HEALTH

BLOG

(Aug.

31,

2011,

12:01

AM),

http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/08/31/140065855/cell-phones-could-helpdoctors-stay-ahead-of-an-epidemic.
15. See Clay Heaton, The Differences Between the Aftermath of the
Earthquakes in Haiti and Japan, GAMEAID (Mar. 17, 2011), http://gameaid.org/

2011/03/17/the-differences-between-the-aftermath-of-the-earthquakes-in-haiti-and-
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a quicker evacuation of Port-au-Prince could have allowed relief
teams to access needy areas more quickly, and thus increase the
effectiveness of response efforts.
To successfully build back countries recovering from natural
disasters, policymakers must consider two fundamental matters: (1)
internally displaced people face numerous and imminent dangersand are virtually helpless-in the aftermath of a disaster; and (2)
response methods must be carefully designed to prevent further harm
to the internally displaced. Only when these matters are fully
considered can policymakers implement thoughtful response efforts to
mitigate the impact these subsequent risks may pose on displaced
populations. As was needed in Haiti, the countries' self-rehabilitative
efforts must be recognized, enforced, and encouraged. Rather than
efforts coordinated solely through NGOs,16 international NGOs must
adhere to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human
Affairs' Guiding Principles and coordinate their post-disaster relief
efforts to complement the work of grass-root initiatives in the
respective disaster-stricken nation. NGO response initiatives that fail
to comply with the Guiding Principles only address problems
temporarily, yet perpetuate a dependency on aid. These organizations
should be subject to sanctions by the United Nations and host
countries, as these organizations' conduct, albeit unintentional, has
contributed to the prolonged continuance of human rights violations.
Using Haiti as an object lesson, this comment examines the plight
of people fleeing from natural disasters and how it is exacerbated by
the international legal community's failure to establish institutions,
bodies, and organizations to ensure compliance with the Guiding
17
This comment argues that current principles, which fail
Principles.
to confer a binding, legal status upon internally displaced persons,
insufficiently address the plight of internally displaced persons in the
wake of natural disasters. In addition to suggesting how current
initiatives can be reconfigured and supplemented, this comment
proposes additional policy changes aimed to prevent NGOs from
japan/.
16. Frontline,supra note 11.
17. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 10 ("Observance of the Guiding Principles
does not affect-positively or negatively-the status of any of these institutions or
persons.").
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unjustifiably benefiting at the expense of the rights of natural disaster
victims, the very people the NGOs are expected to assist.
Section I describes what happened in Haiti in the aftermath of one
of the world's deadliest disasters.' 8 Section II discusses how extant
policy drove the response efforts. Section III discusses how the
experience in Haiti demonstrates the need for a change in policy.
Section IV proposes and outlines changes to the current policy
approach and forecasts how the changes would affect future disaster
relief response efforts. This comment concludes by emphasizing the
heightened need for discussion on this issue.

II. WHAT

HAPPENED IN HAITI IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DISASTER

On January 12, 2010, an earthquake struck the small island of
Haiti. The earthquake, measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale, killed
300,000 people,' 9 and destroyed many homes, leaving 1.5 million
Haitians homeless. 20 As of January 12, 2011, one year after the
earthquake, over one million people remain homeless, living in
crowded camps. 2 1 This shockingly high number of displaced Haitians
raises a variety of human rights concerns, including violations of the
18.

SCHULLER, supranote 10, at 2.

19. While the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs and other
sources initially reported the earthquake death toll to be 222,570, Haitian officials
later increased the death toll for the earthquake to 316,000. Haiti Earthquake
Response, OCHA 1 (Jan. 8, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/minustah/documents/ocha haitioneyear factsheet.pdf;
Randal C. Archibold, Haiti: Quake's Toll Rises to 316,000, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/world/americas/ 14briefs-Haiti.html.
20. UNHCR, HAITI SITUATION RESPONSE 2010: PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE
TO INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND HOST COMMUNITIES IN HAITI 3 (Apr.

Haiti: Speeding
2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4bc71c109.html;
Earthquake Recovery 'Absolute Priority'for 2011, UN Says, U.N. NEWS CENTRE
(Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=37240&CrHaiti&Crl [hereinafter Speeding Earthquake Recovery]. The population of Haiti
was roughly 9.7 million at the time of the earthquake, so the disaster left nearly onesixth of the population homeless. Haiti Population GRAPHIC Shows Impact of
Earthquake, HUFFINGTON

POST (last

updated

May

25,

2011,

4:10

PM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/13/haiti-populationgraphic n 422179.html.
21. Speeding Earthquake Recovery, supra note 20.
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rights to adequate food, clean water, a dignified sanitary environment,
safe and decent housing, humanitarian assistance, health and medical
care, physical integrity, and education. 22
The earthquake has had many implications for Haiti. First, the
substandard living conditions Haitians experienced prior to the
earthquake have been exacerbated.2 3 Second, the number of people
who are inherently more vulnerable to becoming victims of human
rights violations-unaccompanied women, single parents, orphans,
traumatized persons, and persons with disabilities-has increased
dramatically. 24 Displacement poses additional hazards to these at-risk
populations. 25 Third, the continued presence of displaced persons in
and around the streets of Haiti raises personal safety, national security,
and international security concerns.2 6
Based on the increase in the number of displaced persons and an
increase in the number of vulnerable people among those displaced,
an effective response and relief effort became of paramount
importance 27 Recognizing this, United Nations and other institutions
encouraged. the international community to assist in the Haiti relief
22. See ONE YEAR, supra note 2; EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2; NEGLECT,
supra note 2.
23. See Sontag, supra note 7.
24. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION-UNIVERSITY OF BERN, PROJECT ON INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT, PROTECTING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: A MANUAL FOR

LAW AND POLICYMAKERS 18 (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter A MANUAL FOR LAW AND
POLICYMAKERS].

25. Id.
26.

RELIEF

UNICEF, CHILDREN IN HAITI: ONE YEAR AFTER - THE LONG ROAD FROM

TO

RECOVERY

4-29

(Jan.

23,

2011),

available

at

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Children-inHaiti_-_OneYearAfterThe continued presence of
The LongRoad-fromRelief toRecovery.pdf.
displaced Haitians on other citizens' private land fosters tension between groups
with competing interests. Deborah Sontag, In Haiti,Rising CallforDisplacedto Go
Away, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/
world/americas/05haiti.html?pagewanted=all. Furthermore, as Haiti continues to
remain in a state of ungoverned chaos, it could become a safe haven for terrorist
activity.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2009, Ch. 5: TERRORIST
SAFE HAVENS AND TACTICS AND TOOLS FOR DISRUPTING OF ELIMINATING SAFE

HAVENS (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140891.htm.
27.

ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 4.
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efforts and implemented projects with the goal to "build back
better." 28 As revealed by the trajectory of catastrophes that followed
the earthquake, however, the relief efforts, geared to "build back
better," have been stunted from the outset as a result of the inadequate
protection and resources afforded to the displaced population. 29
The sequence of events in Haiti since January 12, 2010, represents
a series of catastrophes that could have been mitigated with more
effective, anticipatory response efforts.
On October 21, 2010,
30
authorities confirmed a cholera outbreak, which, as of December 31,
2010, had claimed over 3,000 lives, caused 71,000 people to be
hospitalized, and infected

1 3 0 ,0 0 0

.31 Recent reports also indicate an

increase in child trafficking, exploitation of women, and sexual abuse
of children. 32 Since the earthquake, children as young as two years
old have been victims of rape, domestic abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination. 33

28. Id.
29. See generally ONE YEAR, supra note 2; EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2;

NEGLECT, supra note 2 (revealing relief efforts in Haiti failed to adequately address
the catastrophic situation).
30.

2010

Haiti

Cholera

Outbreak, CTR.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL,

http://www.cdc.gov/haiticholera/situation (last visited Jan. 24, 2012) ("[fjor a
cholera outbreak to occur, two conditions have to be met: (1) there must be
significant breaches in the water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure used by
groups of people, permitting large-scale exposure to food or water contaminated
with Vcholerae organisms; and (2) cholera must be present in the population.
While it is unclear how cholera was re-introduced to Haiti, both of these conditions
now exist."). Cholera Information for Healthcare Providers Going to Haiti, CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/haiticholera/hcp_goingtohaiti.htm.

31. ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 6.
32. Laurie Hanna, Haiti Children Sold to Human-Traffickersfor as Little as
76p, DAILY MIRROR, Mar. 11, 2011, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/2011/02/22/haiti-children-sold-to-human-traffickers-for-as-little-as-76p115875-22940014/ ("[s]ome infants in the Caribbean country-still in chaos
following last year's horror quake-are being forced into prostitution . . . .
Penniless parents, believing their young will lead better lives elsewhere, are handing
them to crooks posing as concerned officials.").
33. Maternowska, supra note 9. In her time assisting displaced persons in tent
camps, Dr. Maternowska discovered a two-year-old Haitian child who had been
raped after a man slashed through the tent in which she was living. As a result of
the attack, this two-year-old Haitian had gonorrhea in both her mouth and anus. Id.
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The earthquake also adversely affected the democratic rights of
Haitian citizens, further infringing upon their power as a displaced
population. 34 On November 28, 2010, Haiti held its first round of
elections for both the parliament and the presidency against a
backdrop of disorder that marred the elections with uncertainty from
the outset.3 5 The earthquake itself severely hampered the electoral
process, as over one million Haitians lost their voter identification
cards in the disaster, usual polling stations were destroyed, voting
registries were buried under the rubble, and many people were forced
to live outside of their voting districts. 36 Without a doubt, these
factors contributed to the suspect election results that triggered violent
unrest moments after officials announced the preliminary results.37
II. CURRENT POLICIES REGARDING ENVIRONMENTALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS

Using Haiti as an example, this section discusses: (a) the unique
situation people fleeing from natural disasters face, as they do not
meet the legal definition of "refugee" under the 1951 Geneva
Convention; (b) the attempts made to help categorize individuals who
are displaced by the environment; and (c) how the existing policies
drove the response efforts in Haiti.
A. PeopleFleeingFrom NaturalDisastersAre Not Refugees
Despite the migratory implications of natural disasters, people
forcibly displaced from their homes as a result of natural disasters
neither meet the legal definition of "refugee," nor are they entitled to
receipt of certain rights that might be conferred upon them if they met

34. Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/
countriesandterritories/haiti/index.html?scp= 1&sq=haiti%20elections&st-cse (last
updated Sept. 23, 2011).
35. Elizabeth Ferris, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute Burning Issues for
Haiti's Recovery, Presentation to National Council of Churches' Working Group on
Haiti (Sept. 9, 2010).
36. Id.
37. Deborah Sontag, Election Violence Flares in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/world/americas/09haiti.html.
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the elemental refugee requirements.3 8 There is some discussion
regarding whether the definition should be expanded to include
persons who have been displaced as a result of environmental
factors. 39 This subsection provides an overview of the various
attempts that have been made to categorize persons who have been
forcibly displaced from their homes by the environment, and
concludes with the definition that has acquired the greatest support
and recognition.
i. Refugee
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a
"refugee" as:
any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it. 40
Although there have been subsequent amendments to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, people displaced as a
result of natural disasters are still not considered refugees. 4 1 This
group's continued exclusion from the definition of "refugee" has
prompted scholars and other legal policy advocates to formulate new

38. See Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced
Migration: Implicationsfor InternationalLaw, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. 607 (2009).
39. See Auriele Lopez, The Protection of Environmentally-DisplacedPersons
in InternationalLaw, 37 ENVTL. L. 365 (2007).
40. David Keane, The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration:
A Search for the Meaning of "Environmental Refugees," 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REv. 209, 209-223 (2004).
41. Kara K. Moberg, Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally
Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protection, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1107, 1113
(2009).
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definitions, under which people fleeing from natural disasters could
qualify for protection.
ii. EnvironmentalRefugee

In 1985, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) issued
a report entitled EnvironmentalRefugees. 42 In this report, Essam ElHinnawi, a UNEP researcher,4 3 defined "environmental refugees" as
"those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat,
temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental
disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their
existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life."4
Various policy groups have opted not to use the term
"environmental refugee" for four reasons. 45 First, expanding the
definition will.likely devalue the traditional concept of the refugee.4 6
Second, environmental refugees, the majority of whom have not yet
crossed international borders, do not meet the prerequisites outlined in
the 1951 Convention. 47 Third, even should an expanded definition be
proposed, it would be difficult to determine which category of
migrants to include, as an expanded definition could potentially result
in qualifying an enormous number of people as refugees. 48 Fourth,
states will probably oppose the pressure to accept displaced persons
that would accompany an expansion in the refugee definition. 49
42. Keane, supra note 40, at 210 n.3.
43. Diane C. Bates, Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations
Caused by Environmental Change, 23 POPULATION & ENV'T, 465, 466 (2002).

44. Keane, supra note 40, at 210 (quoting El-Hinnawi).
45. Suzette Brooks Masters, Environmentally Induced Migration: Beyond a
Culture ofReaction, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 855, 868 (2000).
46. Id.
47. Moberg, supra note 41, at 1129.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 1132-33; Masters, supra note 45. As seen with the 2011 Japan
disaster, however, when an initial disaster triggers a subsequent disaster like a
tsunami, cross-territorial relocation of displaced persons in the wake of an initial
natural disaster may be appropriate, especially where risks of nuclear radiation
exposure is a possible consequence. Richard Knox, Workers Evacuated from
Japanese Reactor, KPBS (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2011/mar/
Further discussion regarding the
15/workers-evacuated-japanese-nuclear-reactor/.
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In recognizing the controversy surrounding the expansion of the
refugee definition, some international groups have chosen not to use
the term, "environmental refugee."o Rather, organizations have
found it more productive to devise a separate legal framework. 5' The
UNHCR, for example, uses the term, "environmentally displaced
persons."5 2
iii. EnvironmentallyDisplacedPersons
Environmentally displaced persons (EDPs) are defined as
"persons who are displaced within their own country of habitual
residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom
environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major
cause of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole one." 53
While this definition accounts for people who are displaced as a result
of environment and natural disasters, it does not address the rights of
those who are fleeing from the environmental degradation that
prompted their displacement.

struggles host communities might experience as a result of the influx of people who
flee from the site of disaster is warranted. These struggles will become more
difficult when the time for cross-territorial resettlement in the wake of natural
disaster emerges. See John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at
the United Nations, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 477, 480-81 (2009); David
Adam, 50m Environmental Refugees by End ofDecade, UN Warns, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 11,
2005), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2005/oct/12/natural
disasters.climatechange 1.
50. Some of the organizations which do not use the term "environmental
refugee" include the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration, and the
Refugee Policy Group. Keane, supra note 40, at 215; see Atapattu, supra note 38, at
625. In fact, the UNHCR has deemed "environmental refugee" a legal misnomer.
Moberg, supra note 41, at 1114.
51. Atapattu, supra note 38, at 634.
52. Id. at 626.
53. Keane, supra note 40, at 215; Environmentally-Induced Population
Displacements and Environmental Impacts Resulting from Mass Migrations,
UJNHCR
(Oct.
1996), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
4a54bbd6d.html.
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iv. InternallyDisplacedPersons
In recognizing the global crisis of internal displacement and
displaced populations' inability to qualify for protection under the
"refugee" definition, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights appointed Francis M. Deng, a former Representative of the
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, to prepare a
framework for the internally displaced in 1992.54 These Principlesare
not binding, but have acquired international standing and authority.55
As defined by the Guiding Principles,56 internally displaced
persons are
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to
flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized State border.

5

Drawn from norms of customary international law, international
humanitarian law, and international human rights law, the Guiding
54. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Human Affairs, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2,
OCHA/IDP/2004/01 [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
55. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 2. Numerous international groups have
acknowledged and/or welcomed the use of the Guiding Principles in the field (e.g.,
the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council; the U.N.
Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which is comprised of the leaders of the
principal international humanitarian, human rights, and development agencies; the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American
States; the Commission on Refugees of the Organization of African Unity; and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Id.
56. Id. at 1 ("Developed at the request of the [U.N.] Commission [on Human
Rights] and the General Assembly, they set forth international standards for
internally displaced persons based on and consistent with existing humanitarian law,
human rights law, and refugee law by analogy.").
57. Guiding Principles,supra note 54, at 1. Distinguishable from individuals
who, motivated by economic, social, or cultural reasons, voluntarily move from one
location to another, internally displaced persons are people who, because of conflict,
human rights violations, and other natural or manmade disasters, are forced to leave
their home areas.
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Principles have made a significant contribution to the dialogue
concerning the plight of the internally displaced.58 However, in
contrast to a treaty, the Guiding Principles are not binding, and they
fail to confer a legal status upon those who meet the definition of an
"internally displaced person." 59 As a result, while the Principles have
made a significant contribution to the dialogue surrounding the plight
of internally displaced persons, its non-binding nature creates
undesirable consequences: it frustrates the underlying purpose of the
Principles (protecting the needs and rights of the internally displaced)
by unintentionally permitting NGOs to circumvent the needs and
rights of displaced persons without consequences.
B. How Existing PoliciesDrove Response Efforts in Haiti
Because of the non-binding nature of the Guiding Principles,
initiatives taken after natural disasters are often implemented on an ad
hoc basis. With no concrete guidelines or rules on how and when to
respond in order to ensure compliance with the Guiding Principles,
response efforts in the aftermath of disasters can take a variety of
forms, something which was clearly demonstrated after the earthquake
in Haiti.
i. The Response of the United States and Other Nations
In the days following the earthquake, announcements from
officials across the globe clarified the severity of the situation in Haiti.
On January 15, 2010, United States President Barack Obama made an
announcement granting Temporary Protective Status for eighteen
months to Haitians already in the United States, including those in the
United States illegally. 60 President Obama's announcement confirmed
that Haiti was an unstable environment which those Haitians already

58. 2010 High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges, UNHCR
(Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4ca099226.html.
59. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 2.
60. Devin Dwyer & Teddy Davis, Obama Grants Haitians Illegally in U.S.
'Protected Status' for 18 Months, ABC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/HaitiEarthquake/haiti-earthquake-illegal-haitiansprotected-status-quake/story?id=9570995&page=2.
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in the United States should not be subjected.6 ' This announcement
differed from the United States government's prior responses to
Haitians' requests for Temporary Protective Status. Since 2008, the
government had denied these requests. 62 Thus, the sudden change in
January 2010 demonstrated to the people of the United States and to
the rest of the world just how severe the situation in Haiti had

become. 63
President Obama's announcement also revealed an underlying
disconnect: while it provided comfort to those Haitians already in the
confines of the United States, it did nothing for those who still
remained in Haiti, the people-at least from a humanitarian
standpoint-who needed the most assistance. The United Nations'
appeal for countries to extend the suspension of deportation
proceedings for Haitians also highlights the underlying disconnect
between the magnitude of the emergency and the insufficient
protection afforded to those most at risk in the aftermath of disaster. 64
While Haitians living abroad illegally were granted temporary
protection from deportation, Haitians still within the borders of Haiti
(and displaced by the earthquake) were left to fend for themselves in
conditions, which, inherent in these announcements and appeals, were
too dangerous.
ii. NGO-CenteredApproach

Upon learning about the earthquake in Haiti, people around the
world responded with an unprecedented outpouring of aid, amounting
to billions of dollars in pledges. 6 5 Half of the households in America,
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Given the reputation of the United States for strict immigration
policies, this announcement was especially powerful. See Ginger Thompson,
Haitians Look for Shift in Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/us/28haitians.html.
64. OHCHR/UNHCR Urge Extending Suspension of Returns to Haiti,
UNHCR (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/4b7543026.html.
65. SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 2; Arturo A. Valenzuela, Building Back Haiti
Better: Donors' Conference Delivers, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE OFFICIAL BLOG (Apr. 3,
2010), http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/building back haiti; Joe Johns &
MaryAnne Fox, Most Countries Fail to Deliver on HaitiAid Pledges, CNN WORLD,
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amidst the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, 66
donated money to Haitian relief efforts. 67 Six months after the
earthquake, however, Haiti had yet to receive a significant amount of
the aid the world had promised.6 8 Of the $506 million dollars
dispersed to Haiti, less than half of that amount went directly to
Haiti's government to help Haiti in the rebuilding process. 69 Instead,
the money went to NGOs and other charities for aid work.7 0
Providing NGOs with funds complies with Principle 25 of the
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs' (OCHA) Guiding
Principles.7 However, allotting more than half of the money received
to the NGOs, undermines Principle 3, which states, "[n]ational
authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide
protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons
within their jurisdiction." 72

(July 14, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-14/world/haiti.donationsIhaitiangovernment-pledges-interim-haiti-recovery-commission?_s=PM:WORLD.
66. Erik Eckholm, Recession Raises Poverty Rate to a 15-Year High, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/us/17poverty.html.
67. Ctr. for Econ. and Pol'y Res., AidWest vs. Aid Waste, RELIEF AND
RECONSTRUCTION WATCH BLOG (Aug. 4, 2010,

15:28), http://www.cepr.net/

index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/aidwest-vs-aid-waste.
68. Johns & Fox, supra note 65.
69. Jehane Sedky, a member of the U.N. Development Program explained to
CNN, "that's [$506 million] about 9 percent of the money that was pledged. But
about $200 million was money that had been in the pipeline for aid work before the
earthquake, and about another $200 million went directly to the government of Haiti
to help it get back on its feet." Id.
70. Johns & Fox, supra note 65; ONE YEAR, supra note 2. For an account of
where the relief money went see Paul Farmer Examines Haiti 'After the
Earthquake,' NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (July 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/player/

v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t-l1&islist-false&id=137762573&m=137772419
(explaining that about 34% of money received went to civil and military donor
projects, 30% went to the UN and international NGOs, 29% went to other NGOs
and private contractors, 6% were in kind donations, and less than 1% of the pledged
money went to the Haitian government).
71. Principle 25 states, "[i]nternational humanitarian organizations and other
appropriate actors have the right to offer their services in support of the internally
displaced." Guiding Principles,supra note 54, Principle 25.
72. Guiding Principles,supra note 54, Principle 3.
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Despite the amounts of money sent to organizations working in
Haiti, over 1.5 million Haitians continued to live in conditions that
violated their human rights more than one year after the earthquake.
Alarmingly, Haitians do not have an effective way to redress human
rights violations and NGOs do not have an incentive to end Haitians'
dependence on aid.74 While NGOs are expected to adhere to the
Guiding Principles, the NGOs face no real consequences when they
fail to do so.7
IV. HOW THE EXPERIENCES IN HAITI SUGGEST A CHANGE IN THE
EXISTING POLICY APPROACH IS NECESSARY

This section examines whether the existing Guiding Principles,
which fail to confer a binding, legal status upon individuals who are
forcibly displaced from their homes, sufficiently addressed the
catastrophic situation in Haiti. After summarizing recent surveys

73. See ONE YEAR, supra note 2; SCHULLER, supranote 10, at 2.
74. NGOs profit from Haitians' dependency on aid, and "in [former President
William] Clinton's words, NGOs do not appear to be serious about 'working
themselves out of a job' by empowering the committees or reinforcing the
government." SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 32.

75. "Bill Clinton has repeatedly said that there are 10,000 NGOs working in
Haiti, which would make the most NGOs per capita, one for every 900 people." Id.
at 6-7. Only 10-20% of the NGOs, according to the Minister of Planning and
Foreign Cooperation staff, submit their annual report to the government, even
though it is a requirement to function in the country. In general, NGOs in Haiti have
acquired a less than favorable reputation among Haitians. Known as "parallel
states," "states within the state," or "fiefdoms," these NGOs tend to isolate and
exercise total control over certain geographical regions. Id. at 7. This is not to say,
however, that all relief efforts have been ineffective. For example, Partners in
Health (PIH), a non-profit organization dedicated to global health, has an incredibly
effective program in Haiti. The effectiveness of PIH stems from its multi-faceted,
revolutionary, five-principle approach: (1) access to primary health care, (2) free
health care and education for the poor, (3) community partnerships, (4) addressing
basic social and economic needs, and (5) serving the poor through the public sector.
PIH is a model to which all NGOs should aspire. See Stand with Haiti: One-Year
Report, PARTNERS IN HEALTH (2001), available at http://parthealth.3cdn.net/
e73153b5b0ccbfcl93 Olm6b8qk4.pdf; The PIH Model of Care, PARTNERS IN

HEALTH, http://www.pih.org/pages/the-pih-model-of-care
2011).
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conducted in six tent camps for the internally displaced in Haiti,7 6 this
section concludes that current policies insufficiently address the plight
of internally displaced persons in the wake of natural disasters, and
thus, existing policies should be changed.
In its entirety, Principle 18 of the Guiding Principles reads as
follows:
1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate
standard of living. 2. At the minimum, regardless of the
circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities
shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe
access to: (a) Essential food and potable water; (b) Basic shelter
and housing; (c) Appropriate clothing; and (d) Essential medical
services and sanitation. 3. Special efforts should be made to ensure
the full participation of women in the planning and distribution of
these basic supplies. 77
Unfortunately, recent studies indicate this Principle is not being met.
In the months after the earthquake, various researchers conducted
at least four surveys to examine conditions in displacement camps
throughout Haiti and evaluate the effectiveness of relief efforts. The
studies show response efforts were ineffective as they failed to curtail
persistent violations of Haitians' rights to adequate food, clean water,
a sanitary environment, safe and decent housing, health and medical
care, education, and participation,78 rights upon which the Guiding
Principlesare based.
A. LAMP for Haiti Foundation's Ongoing Study
LAMP for Haiti, with the help of others, conducted an ongoing
survey of displaced Haitian families. LAMP conducted an initial
76. The studies were conducted in the following camps: (1) Place St. Pierre in
P6tionville, (2) Acra in Delmas, (3) Diquini/Adventist University in Carrefour, (4)
Champ de Mars in Port-au-Prince, (5) Bouzi in Croix-des-Bouquets, and (6) Parc La
Couronne in Cit6 Soleil. NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 4. Among the 99,140 displaced
people living in these camps, researchers selected ninety families to survey at
random. Id.
77. Guiding Principles,supra note 54, Principle 18.
78.

See EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2; ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 3.
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survey in February 2010, six weeks after the earthquake. Researchers
conducted the subsequent follow up studies in July 2010, six months
after the earthquake, and in December 2010, almost a year after the
earthquake. 79 In addition to documenting how the earthquake affected
Haitian families, researchers sought to measure the international
This subsection
community's effectiveness in delivering aid. 0
discusses the persistent violation of seven human rights to which all
humans are entitled.
i. Food
should, without
authorities
18(2)(a),
Under Principle
discrimination and regardless of the circumstances, provide IDPs safe
access to food.82 The surveys demonstrate that authorities failed to
meet this principle by highlighting three problems with food relief
efforts. First, there was inadequate food distribution. Second, the
method of food distribution failed to ensure that all IDPs, particularly
children, single women, and disabled persons, had safe access to
food. 83 Third, certain landowners eventually withheld food from
camp residents as a means to force people off the land.84
After surveying the six camps, LAMP determined that food
distribution was lacking. Survey respondents from Camp Acra
reported that agencies provided food aid relief only once in the first
forty-two days of the camp's existence." Furthermore, when camp
residents did receive food, some reported getting it only once or twice,
79. While the research team started with ninety families, the researchers
encountered difficulties when they tried to contact the families for the follow up
surveys. Only thirty-seven of the original ninety families participated in the
December 2010 survey. ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 3.
80. Id.
81. The seven basic human rights addressed in this series of studies are: (1)
right to adequate food, (2) clean water, (3) dignified sanitary environment, (4) safe
and adequate housing, (5) health and medical care, (6) education, and (7)
participation. See EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(1II) (Dec. 10, 1948).
82. Guiding Principles,supra note 54, Principle 18(2)(a).
83. See SCHULLER, supra note 10.
84. Id. at 23.
85.

NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 15.
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and there were at least three problems with the food distribution
methods. 86 First, in many camps, receipt of food was contingent upon
having a food card.87 Food card distribution was problematic because:
(1) the organizations distributed far fewer cards than there were
families;8 8 (2) the distribution of the cards was biased and failed to
take family size into account; 89 (3) the organizations distributing the
food cards failed to tell residents when and where the food cards
would be distributed; 90 and (4) the food ration cards were
predominately distributed to men, leading to an increase in genderbased violence, as these cards could be exchanged for sex and
money.9 ' Second, the type of food distributed was not conducive to
the physical conditions of the camps. 92 Third, food distribution
methods failed to ensure everyone had healthy and safe access to food,
86. See NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 15; EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 15.
87. See SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 28; NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 15.
88. EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 15; NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 15.

89. See NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 15 (stating that the resident chosen to
distribute the tickets first allotted them to friends and family); EIGHT MONTHS, supra
note 2, at 15 (explaining that multiple families living in the same tent were treated
like one family and, thus, provided less aid).
90. SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 29 ("Nathalie, a 26 year old mother of three,
said, 'You can't afford to sleep when you hear that there's a card distribution. You
never know where and when they will give it out. You just have to follow the noise
of the crowd and hope you will get yours."').
91. Id. at 28-29 (stating that there have been numerous cases of men using
food ration cards to attempt to force women into having sex). A female member of
Commission of Women Victims for Victims expressed, "Why is it these hard-up
guys get the cards to distribute? Now [the NGOs] are using them to distribute the
cards. And they don't give the cards to women. So now even a young girl in need
is forced to sleep with the person for a little card." Id. This reveals the failure of
NGOs to make "special efforts to ensure the full participation of women in the
planning and distribution of these basic supplies," which the Guiding Principles
outline as being a responsibility of NGOs providing aid. Guiding Principles,supra
note 54, Principle 18(3).
92. For example, relief agencies provided dry rice, which was problematic
because: (1) camp residents did not an adequate supply of clean water with which to
cook the rice, and (2) the physical conditions of the camp made it difficult to keep
personal belongings dry, so that the food would get waterlogged and destroyed
before IDPs could use it. SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 10; see NEGLECT, supra note

2, at 15. Thus, the decision to hand out this type of food demonstrates a lack of
good judgment on the part of the NGOs.
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something required under Principle 18 of the Guiding Principles. For
example, relief agencies' food distribution methods failed to mitigate
the risk of spreading bacteria, an issue which should have been of
paramount concern to them, as the physical conditions of the camps
(e.g., overcrowded, dirty, and tents capable of trapping heat) increased
the potential for bacteria to spread.93
Relief agencies' food
distribution methods were also unsafe. For example, when some
organizations dispersed food aid, they handed it out from a cargo
truck. 94 To receive food, camp residents had to run to the truck and
struggle for a position in line. 9 5 Thus, individuals who were
unwilling, unable, or too weak to fight for a position in line received

no food. 96
Six months after the earthquake, the conditions had not
significantly improved. 97 One year after the earthquake, Haitians
continued to live in a state of crisis, 98 and landowners had stopped
delivering food to camp residents as a means to forcefully evict them
from certain displacement camps. 99 This practice is in direct contrast
93. See NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 28 (demonstrating how food aid distribution
methods and practices can contribute to the spreading of bacteria from one person to
another).
94. Id. at 23; Frontline: The Quake, PBS (2011), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/haiti/view/ [hereinafter The Quake].
95. NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 23 ("Many, of course, resigned themselves to
the impossibility of this and often stayed behind to supervise their children under
their shelters during the distributions.").
This reveals agencies' failures to
successfully disperse aid in a manner that took the family unit into account.
96. Id. at 3 (recounting LAMP for Haiti Task Force's experience observing a
food aid distribution event unfold in which many residents of the camp were left out
of the distribution). Because individuals who are too weak, unwilling, or unable to
take on the crowds fighting for a ticket are likely people who are disabled, sick, and
female-people to whom the Principles confer more consideration-this
distribution method undermines the Guiding Principles. See A MANUAL FOR LAW
AND POLICYMAKERS, supra note 24, at 66.

97. EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 7 (indicating that many of the fifty-two
families interviewed had someone go an entire day without eating in the past week).
98. ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 4 ("One out of two families had at least one
child in their family go a full day without eating the prior week. Twenty-six percent
of families regularly scrounged for food by either asking other families (16%) or by
'going and looking for food' (1 1%).").
99. SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 25 ("A pattern seems to have emerged in
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to the Guiding Principles under which the displaced are said to have
the right to "move throughout freely in and out of camps or other
settlements,"100 and "the right to be protected against forcible return to
or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or
health would be at risk."'0 o
ii. Water

In addition to inadequate and counterproductive food distribution
methods, water distribution was ineffective and failed to fulfill
Principle 18(2)(a), which provides that, "at the minimum, regardless
of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent
authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure
safe access to [. . .] potable water."l 02 The LAMP studies demonstrate
at least two issues surrounding water relief efforts. First, the water
was distributed unevenly.103 Second, distribution methods failed to
ensure safe access to potable water.1 04
Out of the six camps surveyed, three camps reported receiving
water from outside aid organizations. 10 5 Among those, only 35% of
families reported being provided with drinking water.106 Thus, while
some camps received water from aid organizations, the water was
distributed unevenly.
NGOs also failed to distribute water in a way that ensured those
most in need of water received it. Residents reported that only those
in good health were able to access water.' 0 7 Thus, the strong could
which residents are first cut off of services."). Aid is withdrawn as a means to
pressure the displaced people to leave, a practice that is in direct contrast to
Principle 8 of the GuidingPrinciples. EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 20-21.
100. GuidingPrinciples,supra note 54, Principle 14(2).
101. Id. at Principle 15(d).
102. Id. at Principle 18(2)(a).
103.
104.

See ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 6.
See NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 29; EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 8-9.

105. See NEGLECT, supranote 2, at 15, 22, 29.
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id. at 18. Because only those who are strong can access the water, this
violates Principle 18, which states that competent authorities shall provide internally
displaced persons with the aforementioned resources without discrimination.
Guiding Principles,supra note 54, Principle 18.
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receive water, but those who needed water the most-the weak and
dehydrated-could not.10 8 For those who were fortunate enough to
receive water from relief agencies, they discovered the water tended to
be of low quality.109
Residents also reported receiving water in two other forms: from
"pipes" and from public water pumps. 1 0 Initially, these appear to be
viable methods of issuing water. However, further scrutiny reveals
these methods are problematic for two reasons. First, it is dangerous
for women and children, the traditional water carriers in Haiti, to
collect water without accompaniment." Second, the water from the
pumps and pipes comes from the ground, a highly contaminated

area. 112
Six months after the earthquake, with approximately "44% of
families primarily [drinking] untreated water," conditions had not
improved.1 13 A year after the earthquake, and a few months after the
cholera outbreak, researchers discovered that, out of the thirty-seven
families they were able to relocate, only 13% of families reported
receiving potable water. 114 Due to aid organizations' failure to
provide potable water and many families' inability to afford treated
water, numerous families resorted to drinking non-potable water. 15

108. See NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 18. Because weakness is a symptom of
dehydration, it seems reasonable to suggest that those most in need of the water are
not receiving it.
109. Id. at 15. A high percentage of water was described by residents as "lou"
or "heavy water that stuck in their chest all day." Id. The water was said to "goute
lame a" or "taste like the sea." Id. Many used this water only to bathe and wash
clothes, and were forced to buy palatable drinking water. Id.
I10. Id. at 18.
111. EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 9 ("In Parc La Couronne, one family
stated, '[i]t is not safe for women or children to go collect water alone. They are
bothered and picked on."').
112. SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 12 ("Carrefour is blessed with many little
springs. But the problem is that they are running under the destroyed houses and the
decomposing bodies."). The tendency of people to defecate on the ground also
increases the likelihood of the water being contaminated. Id.
113. ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 6.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Id. at 4; EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 27.
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iii. Sanitation
Principle 18(2)(d) of the Guiding Principles states, "at the
minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without
discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally
displaced persons with and ensure safe access to: ...
6 Unfortunately, the studies revealed a failure to
sanitation . . .
provide displaced populations with sanitation resources, an inability to
anticipate the onset of subsequent sanitation issues, and a failure to
maintain sanitation in the camps. Many IDPs had no access to bathing
facilities or toilets; when residents did have access to toilets, the toilets
were too dirty for use, not gender-specific, and unsafe."' Further,
agencies failed to disperse additional, standard resources-such as
toilet paper and soap-that were necessary to ensure the long-term
cleanliness and sanitation of the latrines they installed."
While some agencies provided sanitation resources to camp
residents, the agencies did so without considering how to implement
sustainable relief projects. For example, the French Red Cross built
latrines in some of the camps; however, these latrines were ineffective
in at least three respects. First, there were over 17,000 men, women,
and children in the camp, yet only four latrines were built.1 9 Second,
the holes dug for the latrines were too shallow and filled up rapidly.120
Third, latrine occupants were afforded minimal privacy because the
four walls constituting the "stall" were mere tarps.121
Based on the inadequate, non-anticipatory measures taken to
maintain the cleanliness of these facilities, the latrines evolved into
revolting, unsanitary structures.122 As a result, camp residents started
116. Guiding Principles,supra note 54, Principle 18(2)(d).
117. See generally NEGLECT, supra note 2; EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at
11.
118. See NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 22; SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 10-11;
ONE YEAR, supranote 2, at 7.
119. NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 15.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 7; SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 10-11.
Exacerbating this problem was the high number of people using each toilet. In the
Port-au-Prince area, the average was 273 people per toilet. Id. at 11.
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to urinate and defecate "near their shelters, on the ground, in buckets,
or in plastic bags." 23 Given that more than half of population
surveyed reported they had no access to bathing facilities whatsoever,
the sanitation concerns are especially alarming.' 2 4
More than six months after the earthquake, the sanitation
conditions had yet to improve.' 25 A year after the earthquake, many
residents were without soap, hundreds of residents still shared a small
number of latrines, 126 and many IDPs were forced to sleep on the
ground. 12 7 The unsanitary conditions present in the camps have had
grave implications, such as providing a breeding ground for diseases

like cholera.128
iv. Safe andAdequate Housing
Principle 18(2)(b) requires that IIDPs be ensured safe access to
basic shelter and housing. Alarmingly, most Haitians reported never
receiving sheltering materials from relief agencies. 129 Thus, this
principle was not satisfied.
In some of the camps surveyed, agencies such as the Red Cross
failed to distribute sheltering materials in a manner that ensured those
most in need of supplies would get them.' 30 Rather, agencies
distributed these materials from cargo trucks in a sporadic,
123. NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 15.
124. Id.
125. See EIGHT MONTHS, supranote 2, at 10-11.
126. ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 7. Respondents felt the toilets were unclean,
unsafe, and overcrowded. Id.
127. Haitians Facing 'Intolerable Breach of Human Dignity,' DOCTORS
WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/
news/article.cfm?id=4297.
128. See UN Press Conference By Deputy Special Representative on Situation
in Haiti, U.N., (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/01115 Fisher.doc.htm.
129. NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 14, 22. The housing conditions following the
disaster were particularly alarming. Approximately one-third of the people surveyed
reported living in the open air and having no tarp or tent under which to sleep. Id. at
18. Other IDPs lived in make-shift shelters constructed out of twigs, wood, bed
sheets, and tarps. Id.
130. Id.
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unorganized manner. As a result, only those physically capable of
maneuvering through the crowd to reach the back of the truck
received supplies.13 1 This distribution method contradicts certain
provisions of the Guiding Principles that: (1) prohibit aid from being
dispersed in a discriminatory manner;1 32 (2) indicate that
"displacement shall not be carried out in a manner that violates the
rights to life, dignity, liberty and security of those affected";1 33 and (3)
indicate that "internally displaced persons, whether or not their liberty
has been restricted," shall be protected against rape, gender violence,
and any form of indecent assault."' 34
Six months after the earthquake, "78% of families lived without
enclosed shelter."13 1 One year after the earthquake, families still
lacked sturdy housing and could not return to their former homes
because their homes had been destroyed and not yet rebuilt. 136
Alarmingly, "40% [of IDPs] had been threatened with forced eviction
since the earthquake," despite having no place to go.' 37
v. Health and Medical Care
Pursuant to Principle 18(2)(d), "at the minimum, regardless of the
circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall
provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to ...
131. See id. at 14.
132. GuidingPrinciples,supra note 54, Principle 18(2). If only the strong can
obtain the materials for shelter, then the weak are left to fend for themselves. If aid
is not distributed in a manner that takes these individuals' needs into account, efforts
to rebuild will be stunted from the outset, as a majority of the population is still in
the recovery phase and remains unable to even attempt to rebuild. Addressing the
needs of these people is important to the future success of Haiti, as failing to supply
them with necessary resources prolongs their fragile state and continued presence in
the displacement camps.
133. GuidingPrinciples,supra note 54, Principle 8.
134. Id at Principle 11(2)(a). For an overview of the types of indecent assault
against women that occurred in some camps, see Frontline,supra note 11, at 6:15.
135. EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 12.
136. ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 4.
137. Id ("The UN estimated in September 2010 that 29% of 1,268 camps
studied had been closed forcibly, meaning the often violent relocation of tens of
thousands of people.").
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essential medical services." Although numerous aid organizations
provided medical services to residents, efforts were not coordinated. 138
Lack of foresight and coordination exacerbated the likelihood that
disease and sickness would spread, and six months after the
earthquake, "there were 245 independently listed health problems
among 45 families."' 39 One year later, Haitians battled a cholera
outbreak,140 and healthcare efforts had yet to significantly improve. 14 1
Some families delayed addressing their medical needs because they
could not wait in the long lines outside of medical clinics. 142
vi. Education
In December 2009, a month before the earthquake hit Haiti, half
of all school-aged children were not in school.143 The earthquake,
which either damaged or destroyed 90% of Port-Au-Prince's schools,
exacerbated the problems associated with establishing a strong
education system in Haiti. 144 Article 32.1 of Haiti's Constitution
guarantees a right to education.14 5 Under Principle 23(4), "[e]ducation
and training facilities shall be made available to internally displaced
persons, in particular adolescents and women, whether or not living in
camps, as soon as conditions permit." Yet, out of the 600,000

138. The Quake, supra note 94. For example, in the second week of the
earthquake, while supplies and materials for amputations had arrived, there was a
shortage of other necessary supplies like pain killers to give patients once they were
in post-operative care. Id. In addition, agencies failed to coordinate and prioritize
their flights effectively: "television reporters landed before doctors, shoes and
clothing before bandages." Id. at 25:43-25:48.
139. EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 16. Camp residents reported suffering
from illnesses including influenza, malaria, diarrhea or digestive illness, eye
illnesses, aches and pains, stress-related illnesses, heart conditions, general
infections, vaginal infection, and respiratory issues. NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 9.
140. See UN Press Conference By Deputy Special Representativeon Situation
in Haiti, supra note 128.
141. ONE YEAR, supra note 2, at 1.
142.

See NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 19.

143. PaulFarmerExamines Haiti 'After the Earthquake,' supra note 70.
144. The Quake, supra note 94, at approximately 10:00.
145.

SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 16.
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children who lived in the camps in the summer of 2010,146 many of
them were not back in school; 147 "according to UN staff, the
government issued a decree forbidding schools from being built
within the camps."l 48
Six months after the earthquake, despite the need for schools and
the Guiding Principles' promotion of education for IDPs, the majority
of children were still not in school.14 9 This is problematic because
education is a critical component of promoting awareness of risks
associated with disasters; it also equips Haitians with skills that
complement disaster relief efforts, helping to prevent the onset of
subsequent, preventable disasters.15 0
vii. Participation
Participation of local groups in the rebuilding process is another
5 1 While the NGOs helped
critical aspect of the Guiding Principles.1
146. Id. at 15.
147. Out of the six camps surveyed, families in each camp had children who
were no longer able to attend school. Id. at 14 ("[U]p to 40% of schools could not
re-open because of the extent of the damage to physical buildings and the deaths of
school personnel . .

...

148. Id. at 15.
149. EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 25 ("[Twenty-eight percent] of families
had school-aged children under 18 who did not attend school . . . .").
150. Current efforts are reaction-based rather than proactive-based. More
NGOs should follow PIH's methodology in developing a sustainable education
system in the field of engineering before disaster strikes. For example, an agency
could implement an educational program that seeks to educate people about
architecture and how to build earthquake-resistant structures. See Julie Satow, Born
of 9/11, an Effort to Rebuild Shattered Haiti, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/realestate/commercial/O2haiti.html?pagewante
d=all. While the Haitian government has ultimate authority over education in Haiti,
some NGOs have worked to establish schools in Haiti throughout the years. See
Haiti Recovery, UNICEF, http://www.unicefusa.org/work/emergencies/Haiti/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2011). Similar to UNICEF, other organizations should work with
the local government to reinforce the public education system. For an analogous
situation where NGOs were encouraged and required to work with a country's local
government to help the country recover from a state of complete disaster, see Paul
Farmer's discussion on Rwanda in Paul Farmer Examines Haiti 'After the
Earthquake,' supra note 70.
151. GuidingPrinciples,supra note 54, Principle 18.
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distribute relief materials, the manner of distribution has impeded the
Haitians' ability to build back better themselves, as NGOs have
continually excluded local grassroots groups from their recovery
efforts.15 2
B. Survey Examining the Impact ofNGOs on Human Rights for Portau-Prince'sInternally DisplacedPeople
Through quantitative and qualitative surveys, researchers from
York College and a professor at the Facult6 d'Ethnologie, Universit6
d' Itat d'HaYti, gathered valuable information from camp residents
about the "conditions and services within the camps" and "residents'
level of understanding and involvement in the camp committees."153
Researchers' interviews with committee representatives helped to
further elucidate the issues individuals living in camps currently

face.154
According to the research, physical conditions in the camps make
it impossible for residents to sleep, bathe in privacy, and keep
important personal effects like voter identification cards, birth
certificates, and marriage licenses dry, intact, and safe.'15 The camps
lack proper drainage systems, proper sanitation, an appropriate
152. This top-down instead of bottom-up approach is problematic because
Haitians' continued exclusion from the relief efforts fosters a sense of dependency
and immobility, both of which impede the nation's attempts to "build back better."
See SCHULLER, supra note 10, at 27-30 (offering an example of NGOs' failure to
help assist Haitian grass-root initiatives PEtiole Brillant (Shining Star) and Men Nan
Men (Hand in Hand). This practice is also inconsistent with the Guiding Principles.
See Guiding Principles,supra note 54, Principle 28(2).
153. SCHULLER, supra note 10, (Executive Summary).
154. Id. at 18-19. Researchers conducted two surveys approximately six
months after the earthquake; the third survey was conducted one year after the
earthquake. Id. The study revealed four factors associated with the patterns in the
gaps in services: (1) presence of NGO Camp Management agencies, (2)
municipality, (3) size of the camp, and (4) the ownership of the land on which the
camp sits. Id. While an analysis of these differences is warranted, space does not
permit such an analysis. In general, it is important to note that the location of the
camp seemed to influence whether or not the camp received aid. Those camps
farther away from Port-au-Prince received fewer resources, if any at all, but camps
in and around Port-au-Prince did receive aid. Id.
155. Id. at 10.
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number of toilets, and gender-segregated toilets.1 56 Rashes are also
common because tents trap the heat.15 1
The York College study also outlined two key security issuesThese findings
gender-based violence and forced eviction. 8
confirmed the issues highlighted in the LAMP studies. It also
emphasized that coordination of relief efforts is a central concern. 159
When paired with uncoordinated relief efforts, the existence of
gender-based violence, forced evictions, low levels of participation,
and aid dependency suggest response policy should change. Current
policy has failed to both effectively address the rights of the IDPs and
mobilize them, thus preventing IDPs from having the capacity to
move beyond a state of disaster and into a period of recovery.' 60
The rights of the internally displaced people in Haiti should be
addressed, and current efforts to help the internally displaced in the
wake of a natural disaster need to be evaluated and supplemented. 16 1
The time is now to rethink current policy approaches aimed to assist
internally displaced persons.1 62
156. Idato-11.
157. Id. at 10.
158. Id. at 22-23.
159. For example, "residents mentioned that NGOs had talked about installing
a water system but seven months after the earthquake, it still had yet to materialize.
According to Valerie Kaussen who investigated the situation, most of the problem
lies in the fact that two NGOs, Solidarite and World Vision International, had begun
to work in the camp at the same time, so each assumed the other would finish the
project." Id. at 12.
160. See id.; EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2; Randal C. Archibold, Haitians
Forced Out of Tents to Homes Just as Precarious, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/24/world/americas/24haiti.html?r-1.
161. With global warming and other environmental disasters prompting
exodus from other nations, the development of a comprehensive plan to address the
plight of those who are displaced as a result of environmental factors is becoming
increasingly necessary. See Rep. of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, U.N.
Doc. A/65/12, at 8; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 12 (Oct. 7, 2010). For example,
in Japan, thousands of people displaced struggled to find places to live nearly a
month after the March 11, 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami. Kumiko
Makihara, Op-Ed., A Month After the Shock, a Different Japan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/opinion/14ihtedmakiharal4.
13,
html?ref japan.
162. With the United States of America approximately 700 miles northwest of
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V. A NEW POLICY APPROACH AND FORECASTING ITS IMPLICATIONS

A. A New Policy Approach
Various changes could be made to improve the quality of relief
efforts by addressing the needs of the internally displaced in the wake
of natural disasters.163 First, coordination of relief efforts and the
logistics of its distribution can be improved.164 Second, relief
the small island, America becomes an increasingly desirable place where people,
still homeless more than a year after the earthquake, might choose to flee. See
Magnitude 7.0 - Haiti Region, USGS (Jan. 12, 2010), http://earthquake.usgs.gov/
The risk of these potential
earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/us201Orja6.php.
motivate members of the
further
should
realities
repercussions becoming
international community to more effectively address the issues that accompany
natural disasters' capacity to forcibly displace thousands of people from their homes.
163. See NEGLECT, supra note 2, at 31.
164. In 1991, the General Assembly requested the United Nations "establish a
central register of all specialized personnel and teams of technical specialists, as
well as relief supplies, equipment and services available within the United Nations
system and from Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations, that can be called upon at short notice by the United Nations." G.A.
Res. 47/1, 27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19, 1991). In response to this, the
OCHA established a Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities as an
operational tool to support the United Nations system and the international
community as a whole in their efforts to ensure expeditious delivery of the required
humanitarian emergency assistance. Introduction to the OCHA Central Register,
OCHA, http://ocha.unog.ch/cr/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). The Central Register
includes five directories of specific disaster management assets: (1) Search and
Rescue Directory; (2) Military and Civil Defense Assets Directory; (3) Emergency
Stockpiles of Disaster Relief Items; (4) Rosters of Disaster Management Expertise;
and (5) Advanced Technologies for Disaster Response Directory. Id. The registry
also includes three directories of contact persons: (1) National Focal Points and
Legislation for Customs Facilitation in International Humanitarian Emergency
Assistance; (2) Contact Points for Disaster Response; and (3) Major Donors of
Emergency Humanitarian Assistance. Id. While this registry lists the resources
available, it lacks the critical link between what the victims of the disaster know
they need and what the international community thinks they need. This comment
suggests the website could be improved to allow victims of a natural disaster to have
a say in what items they need. U.N. policymakers should look to Disaster Relief
Australia's registry as a model for an international registry. Lisa Banks, Online
Registry Launched to Help Queensland Flood Victims: Disaster Relief Australia
Continues Legacy of Victorian Bushfire Appeal, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 13, 2011,
2:54
PM),
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/373305/onlineregistry
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agencies should be required to provide aid in a manner that complies
with the Guiding Principles. Third, relief agencies' efforts should be
anticipatory and sustainable. Fourth, IDPs' access to education and
jobs in the wake of natural disaster could be improved, thus fostering
their mobility, which is an essential factor in the long-term goal of
ending their displacement.16 5
While each of these proposed changes is important to "build back
better," the four proposed changes are divided into two categories:
primary concerns and secondary concerns. The primary concerns
focus on coordinating relief efforts from the outset to provide disaster
victims with quick, appropriate, and efficient relief. The secondary
concerns focus on helping displaced populations move from a state of
disaster into a state of prolonged, sustainable recovery by reinforcing
the local and public operations of the government. These two
categories of concerns complement one another, and, in the aggregate,
would help create an environment that is more conducive to a
successful recovery in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
i. Primary Concerns
1. CoordinationofReliefEfforts and Logistics ofDistribution
Aid logistics can be improved in three ways. First, the U.N. could
make improvements to advance the productivity of OCHA's current
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS).1 66 For
example, in addition to the tabs which already appear on the website, a
new tab titled, "international natural disaster relief registry" (INDRR)
should be created.167 The INDRR homepage would list each country
launchedhelpqueensland flood victims/.
165.

See generally SCHULLER, supra note 10.

166.

GLOBAL

DISASTER

ALERT

AND

COORDINATION

SYSTEM,

http://www.gdacs.org/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) ("The Global Disaster Alert and
Coordination System provides near real-time alerts about natural disasters around
the world and tools to facilitate response coordination, including media monitoring,
map catalogues and Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre.").
167. While the GDACS currently has a "Coordination" tab which links users
to its Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (VOSOCC), the VOSOCC
does not rely on the participation of the actual victims of the environmental disaster.
"The Virtual OSOCC is a platform for information exchange restricted to disaster
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in hyperlink format, which would allow users to view that country's
profile.
Each country's profile would outline the country's
geographical location, terrain, annual climate, and the types of
disasters to which it is prone. Based on the country's profile and its
level of disaster risk, the country's government, along with its
residents, would create a registry (analogous to a bridal or baby
registry) listing the materials and types of services they anticipate
needing if and when a disaster strikes.' 68 The country would submit
its list to the U.N. for approval.169 Based upon the U.N.'s review of
the list, the list would either be approved and uploaded onto the online
registry, or rejected and returned to the country with a list of issues
needing revision. The country could then revise and resubmit its
registry. Once the country's registry is approved, it would be
uploaded to the online database.
In a disaster situation, the INDRR would operate as follows.
First, upon learning that a country has been hit by a natural disaster,
NGOs would go to OCHA's current GDACS, click on the INDRR
tab, log in to the registry to view that country's registry profile, view
that country's itemized registry, and click on the items and services it
intends to provide the disaster stricken area.1 70 The registry would
managers in governments and NGOs that deal with international disaster response.
In general, representatives from media and interested individuals are not provided
with user-accounts."
Virtual OSOCC,
HUMANITARIAN
INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
(Oct.
19,
2007), http://phpeace.qwarx.com/huminman.net/
virtualosocc. Because staff members are given login information as they are
deployed, this system seems more reactive than proactive.
168. Under Principle 28 of the GuidingPrinciples,"[s]pecial efforts should be
made to ensure the full participation of internally displaced persons in the planning
and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration."
Guiding
Principles,supra note 54, Principle 28(2). The LAMP studies, however, revealed a
lack of participation by the local people in aid relief efforts. "People are not
consulted about their needs." EIGHT MONTHS, supra note 2, at 2. The proposed
registry system would help remedy this situation, as it would increase the level of
participation among the native people both before the disaster and at the onset of the
disaster. Upon signaling the U.N. to the types of resources it anticipates needing in
a time of disaster, the U.N. can start seeking out the necessary items and services.
169. Certain things the U.N. would look out for: adequate supplies for all areas
of need, frivolous requests, needs that are unique to the geographical and cultural
nature of the country, etc.
170. See Lisa Banks, supra note 161 (explaining an analogous, domestic
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improve coordination amongst NGOs by tracking and documenting
which materials NGOs intend to provide. It would also provide local
residents with a chance to participate in the disaster relief planning
process, a requirement of the Guiding Principles. Finally, the registry
would operate on a real-time basis, and throughout the disaster relief
process, NGOs would document their inventory and update the
registry accordingly.
To promote the transparency of NGOs, the registry should also be
made public. If made public, donors could go online and select the
exact items they would like to donate to relief efforts. This would
allow donors to know precisely what their money is buying, as
opposed to the current practice of blindly giving money to NGOs.
Furthermore, if donors perceive they have more control over the
money and resources they donate, this could lead to an increase in
disaster relief donations, which could help increase the effectiveness
of relief efforts. Agencies would still be permitted to solicit general
monetary donations as well, though donors would have the power to
direct their money to specific funds of their choice. 71
2. RequiringReliefAgencies to Comply with the Guiding Principles
To increase the accountability of NGOs and to help promote the
implementation of sustainable relief efforts, NGOs should be required
to comply with the Guiding Principles when administering aid. The
improvement to the OCHA's website suggested above would provide
an opportunity to incorporate a contractual agreement between the
U.N. and NGOs. For example, upon clicking and confirming its
selection of the item and/or service from the list, the NGO would enter
into a contractual relationship with the U.N. (the organization that
would oversee the registry), such that the NGO would be accepting
the duty to provide these items and/or services in a manner that is
consistent with, and in furtherance of, the Guiding Principles. A
breach of this duty would result in sanctions imposed by the U.N.

system that was launched in Australia after the Queensland flood).
171. Donors would be able to choose from specific categories of funds,
including, but not limited to, Education, Cash-for-Work Programs, Infrastructure,
Rubble Removal, Apparel, Sanitation, Water, etc.
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In addition to the contractual relationship which the NGOs enter
via the online transaction (i.e., a contractual promise to provide those
materials), other changes could be made to ensure NGOs offer
assistance in compliance with the Guiding Principles. For example,
NGOs could be required to sign written contracts with the U.N. before
they enter a disaster-stricken country. The contract should contain
terms outlining the NGO's duty to comply with the Guiding
Principles and the consequences if an NGO breaches its duty. By
imposing requirements on NGOs and implementing disciplinary
enforcement mechanisms, this could deter NGOs from providing help
that is not conducive to the situation, and would make the agencies
more accountable.
Critics of this formal arrangement may argue it will deter NGOs
from participating in relief efforts out of fear they will be "punished"
by meritless complaints about inadequate services. However, this
mechanism will serve to keep the right NGOs in the country and the
wrong ones out. This process could also be criticized for consuming
time, something which is of the essence after a natural disaster. To
account for this, the contracts would be formed in advance as part of
the requirements the agency must fulfill when applying for
consultative status with the U.N.17 2 Under this method, the initial
writing would be the formal contractual relationship between the U.N.
and the NGO-in exchange for the U.N. granting it consultative
status-would accept the duty to adhere to the Guiding Principles.
Then, when disaster strikes and an NGO chooses to assist a country
listed on the registry, the U.N. would issue the NGO an informal
reminder of the previously agreed upon contract. This would put the
NGO on notice of its duty and hold the NGO more accountablewithout slowing down relief efforts. NGOs should also be subject to a
172. See NGO Related Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011)
(explaining that certain NGOs can apply for consultative status with the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations). Attaining consultative status
allows the agency to engage in a collaborative working relationship with the U.N.,
and "[s]ometimes, as advocacy groups, they espouse UN themes, implementing
plans of action, programmes and declarations adopted by the United Nations." Id;
see also How to Apply for Consultative Status, UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, http://csonet.org/?menu=83 (last visited Nov. 15,
2011) (explaining the application process).
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more thorough, annual evaluation as opposed to the current
quadrennial report model, 173 as increased monitoring of the NGOs
would also contribute to this model's success.
An alternative approach to mandating compliance would be to
confer a special status on NGOs that have contractually agreed to
adhere to the Guiding Principles.
Analogous to commercial websites that display the "VeriSign
Trust" symbol, the U.N. could design a symbol for organizations that
have contractually agreed to comply with the Principles.174
Organizations that have promised compliance would receive special
acknowledgement, and a symbol would appear next to the
organization's title on the website to inform donors whether the NGO
adheres to the GuidingPrinciples. By promoting consumer awareness
of the Principles and the organizations that have promised
compliance, more people will likely donate to organizations with U.N.
trusted status than to those without it.175 Eventually, this could
indirectly result in all organizations promising compliance, as donors'
tendencies to donate to trusted organizations would likely motivate
NGOs to obtain trusted status to stay competitive.

173. See Submitting your Quadrennial Report, UNITED NATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, http://csonet.org/?menu=85 (last

visited Nov. 15, 2011) (discussing the guidelines and requirements for NGOs
submitting their Quadrennial Reports). Currently, only NGOs in general or special
consultative status with the ECOSOC need to submit reports to the Committee on
NGOs. Id. Changes to this policy could also be made, such that all NGOs in
consultative status with the U.N., including those in the roster category of
consultative status, are required to submit quadrennial reports. This change could
help ensure that all NGOs are held to the same standard.
174. Secure Site Pro with EV, VERISIGN, http://www.verisign.com/ssl/buy-ssl(last
certificates/extended-validation-pro-ssl-certificates/index.html?tid=hp-banner
visited Sept. 10, 2011).
175. Analogous to how the VeriSign seal on websites helps attract more
customers to businesses' websites and gives customers more confidence to complete
online transactions, the U.N. could create a Guiding Principles Trusted seal, confer
that status upon qualifying organizations, which, in turn, would encourage people to
donate to the organizations with this special status. See id.
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3. Anticipatory and SustainableRelief Efforts
To improve the quality of post-disaster relief efforts,
organizations must anticipate subsequent, foreseeable risks, and
provide sustainable relief only. While the INDRR would take into
account coordination from the outset of the disaster by documenting
what supplies each agency is bringing, the INDRR would also need to
anticipate the distribution of aid in a manner that is conducive to the
overall rebuilding process. For example, rather than having agencies
arrive in the area where the disaster struck, the aid agencies need to be
dispersed to foster decentralization and movement away from the
disaster zone. With this in mind, the INDRR would be created in
combination with a grid distribution system.
Establishing a grid system with coordinates for aid distribution
would help improve aid distribution processes. When relief agencies
send out their agents, workers, and volunteers, there should be a
master grid to which they look and send people to the necessary
locations. Each square in the grid would represent an area in the
country and each should have a certain ratio of NGO leaders from a
variety of groups (health, education, clean water, home builders, etc.)
to a certain number of Haitians. 176 Under this model, the NGO leaders
would be required, as part of the contract, to engage in teaching
relationships with the people and help teach them the skills they need
to sustain themselves.177 The grid system would also effectively
176. OCHA's current response approach, known as the Cluster Approach,
seeks to implement a similar idea and aims to: (1) "ensure sufficient global
capacity"; (2) "ensure predictable leadership"; (3) "strengthen accountability"; and
(4) "improve strategic field-level coordination and prioritization."
Cluster
Approach, ONE RESPONSE, http://oneresponse.info/Coordination/ClusterApproach/
Pages/Cluster%20Approach.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2011). The cluster approach
is designed around the concept of partnerships between U.N. agencies, international
organizations, and NGOs. Key sectors of the response cluster approach include: (1)
logistics; (2) nutrition; (3) emergency shelter; (4) camp management and
coordination; (5) health; (6) protection; (7) agriculture; (8) emergency
telecommunication; (9) early recovery; (10) education; and (11) sanitation, water,
and hygiene.
See How are Disaster Relief Efforts Organized?, OCHA,
http://business.un.org/en/assets/39c87a78-fec9-402e-a434-2c355f24e4f4.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 5, 2011). As seen in Haiti, however, this approach must be modified
and supplemented to be more effective.
177. See The PIH Model of Care, supra note 75. Analogous to PIH's
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utilize the country's geographical arrangement in the distribution of
aid. For example, in efforts to decentralize the population away from
the densely crowded, disaster-stricken area, aid would be disbursed in
a way that would draw people out of the congested area. While
evacuating people from disaster areas is currently not encouraged,
"unless the safety and health of those affected requires their
recent natural disasters reveal evacuation as an
evacuation,"'
increasingly viable and necessary option.179 Thus, when there is a
disaster of great magnitude, people should be required, if possible, to
evacuate the area in order for rubble removal to take place. As people
are leaving the disaster-stricken area, they should receive new
Each camp should have a registry of all of its
identification cards.'
residents and an orientation period where residents draft the rules of
the camps, devise the consequences for violating the rules, nominate
certain people to run for the camp coordinator position, and then hold
elections. 181

While having the registry and grid system would help improve
coordination from the onset of the disaster, it is equally important to
improve the quality of sustainable relief efforts aimed to better assist
displaced populations in the wake of natural disaster. For example,
establishing reverse osmosis machines and composting toilets before
disaster strikes could help mitigate the high need for relief agencies to
enter the country in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, when,

principles of "community partnerships" and "serving the poor through the public
sector," the term. "teaching relationships" refers to collaborative relationships with
local ministries and residents to help victims of natural disaster move from a state of
disaster and into a sustainable period of recovery. For an analogous situation where
a country faced immense obstacles to rebuild a nation, see Paul Farmer's discussion
on Rwanda in Paul FarmerExamines Haiti 'After the Earthquake,'supranote 70.
178. Guiding Principles,supra note 54, Principles 6(1), 6(2)(d).
179. Instead of discouraging evacuation, the Guiding Principles should
encourage and/or mandate evacuation of victims to areas that are safer and more
resistant to subsequent disasters that could strike and arise as a result of the initial
disaster. See Matthew Wald, Japan Orders Evacuation Near 2nd Nuclear Plant,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/asial
12nuclear.html.
180. SCHULLER, supranote 10, at 10, 27.

181.

See id.
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because of the disaster's destruction, relief agencies may be unable to
reach the site of disaster. 182
ii. Secondary Concerns
1. FosteringMobility through Education and Cashfor
Work Programs
Even prior to the earthquake, Haitians suffered from severe
poverty, which is often correlated with a host of other problems,
including child trafficking, sexual abuse, and violence. 183 The
earthquake further exacerbated the impoverished conditions in Haiti,
leading to an increase in child trafficking, sexual abuse, and
violence.1 84 To keep children off the rubble-filled, chaotic streets in
the wake of a natural disaster, post-disaster relief efforts should focus
on implementing cash for education programs. These programs would
help: (1) incentivize families to send their children and teenagers to
school; (2) create income for families; (3) keep children off the
streets; and (4) foster the development of human capital among
Haitian children.' 8 5
182. See ONE YEAR, supra note 1, at 6; Nicholas D. Kristof, Haiti, Nearly a
Year Later, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/
opinion/02kristof.html.
183. See UNESCO, Human Trafficking in Mozambique: Root Causes and
Recommendations 13, 31 (Policy Paper No. 14.1E)) (2006), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001478/147846e.pdf.
184. Eve Blossom, Haiti: Human Trafficking on the Rise after Earthquake,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2010, 1:06 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eveblossom/haiti-human-trafficking-o b 436412.html. The chaos which followed the
earthquake in Haiti no doubt made the job of child traffickers easier. Mike
Thomson, Haiti Earthquake One Year On: the Lost Generation,BBC NEWS (Jan. 7,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12128349.
For example, "[t]raffickers,
wanting to cash in on the chaos, have been buying the children off their desperate
parents, and some of them are grabbed in neighbouring Dominican Republic while
they are scrounging for food." Oliver Pickup, Haiti Earthquake Children Sold by
theirParentsfor less than 76p each to Traffickers, say UNICEF, MAILONLINE (Feb.
22,
2011),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1359152/Haiti-earthquakechildren-sold-parents-80-PENCE-traffickers.html.
185. Orazio Attanasio et al., Child Education and Work Choices in the
Presenceof a ConditionalCash Transfer Programmein Rural Colombia 3 (Inst. For
Fiscal Studies, Working Paper No. 06/13) (2008) (explaining the effectiveness of
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Under the cash for education framework, parents would receive
monetary subsidies if their children attended a certain percentage of
school classes.186 Because parents would earn money for sending
their children to school, the parents would not be forced to rely on
alternative sources of income. Consequently, parents would be less
likely to resort to selling their children into servitude and trafficking
rings.'8 7
Relief efforts aimed to foster the development of human capital
among internally displaced persons around the globe should be
encouraged, as they can help serve as catalysts for change and social
mobility. UNICEF already supports child-friendly schools, a model
which revolves around the rights of the child.188 However, this model
lacks the necessary component to motivate school attendance.
Modifying UNICEF's current child-friendly school model to
supplement it with a cash-for-education component could prove to be
effective in helping IDPs, specifically children, by encouraging them
to attend school and avoid the dangerous streets. These efforts could
be even further supplemented by reinforcing and implementing cashFamiliasen Acci6n, a conditional cash transfer program implemented in Colombia,
in fostering increased school enrollment and attendance, especially among 14- to 17year-old children), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp06l3.pdf. As of
January 2010, children under eighteen comprised almost half of Haiti's population.
Emma Wilkinson, Haiti Children Face Ongoing Disease and Trauma, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 15, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8461064.stm. Because children
form such a significant part of Haiti's population, it is imperative that they are
included in the rebuilding process.
186. This is analogous to most conditional cash transfer programs, including
Familias en Acci6n, where parents' receipt of a subsidy was conditioned on their
children attending at least 80% of school classes. Attanasio, supra note 182, at 6.
187. Political Agenda for Children, UNICEF, www.unicef org/media/files/
HaitiPoliticalAgendaEng.doc (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
188. Pursuant to UNICEF's Child-Friendly School Model, "[s]chools should
operate in the best interests of the child; Educational environments must be safe,
healthy and protective; Classrooms should be endowed with trained teachers and
adequate resources; and within them, children's rights must be protected and their
voices must be heard." Child Friendly Schools, UNICEF, http://www.unicefusa.org/
work/education/child-friendly-schools/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). This childfriendly approach is used in emergencies after disaster. But, as seen with other relief
efforts, this approach depends on partnerships with other actors in the international
arena, but it fails to depend on partnerships with the disaster victims, the very people
they are expected to assist.
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for-work programs.' 89 All of these initiatives would give IDPs the
tools and skills they need to build back better and transcend the
disastrous circumstances.
B. Forecastingthe Implications of the ProposedChanges
While the GuidingPrincipleshave made a significant contribution
to this area of law, their non-binding nature has resulted in nonThis non-binding nature has also
uniform application.' 90
unintentionally facilitated countries' and NGOs' non-compliance, as
the Principles do not provide the affected populations with an
effective remedy to address their country's and other groups' failures
to comply with the Guiding Principles. It is a framework without
teeth.191 These proposed changes to current policy and the OCHA's
website could provide the Guiding Principles instrument with the
strength needed to be an effective model. While giving the Haitians a
right to address the country's and other organizations' failures to
adhere to the Principles is a viable option, the changes proposed in
this comment hope to prevent the violations from occurring in the first
place. Such changes also have the potential to mobilize internally
displaced populations by providing them with incentives to help
further their interests, their children's interests, and their country's
interests.

189. CHF Cash for Work Programs Helping Haitian Women Get Back on
Their Feet, CHF INTERNATIONAL, http://chfinternational.org/node/34052 (last
visited Nov. 2, 2011).
190. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 9 ("Being internally displaced, however, is
not a legal status. The Guiding Principles offer a descriptive identification of the
internally displaced ... ; they do not confer a special legal status on those
displaced.... They do, however, have special needs by virtue of their displacement.
It is for this reason that the Guiding Principles spell out how the law should be
interpreted and applied to them.. .. This does not mean that all situations of
internal displacement require international attention. If the needs of the internally
displaced are met effectively by their governments, the international community
need not become involved unless the government itself requests assistance.").
191. While all international organizations and other committees that come in
contact with IDPs are encouraged to respect these Principles, there are no
consequences for their failure to do so. Id. at 10.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the response efforts in Haiti, current policies
fail to effectively address the rights and needs of IDPs in the wake of a
natural disaster and fail to promote sustainability. While the Guiding
Principles do provide a solid framework for addressing the needs of
the displaced, the disconnect between the relief services rendered and
the goals of relief organizations must be reconciled, and the current
disaster relief policy efforts must be supplemented with other
initiatives grounded in sound social policy.
The need for legal provisions to accommodate the distress that
arises from natural disasters has become more pressing.19 2 Using the
Haiti disaster as an object lesson, this comment has proposed a variety
of changes to help prevent other disasters from reaching this
In addition to reconfiguring and
magnitude of destruction.
supplementing the U.N.'s current GDACS website, this comment has
proposed the following policy changes: increasing participation levels
among potential victims of natural disasters and their influence on the
aid distribution process, changing the policies surrounding NGOs
registering with the U.N., increasing the extent to which NGOs are
monitored and evaluated, and requiring NGOs to sign a contract
agreeing they will: (1) adhere to the Guiding Principles;and (2) only
offer programs and disaster relief assistance that will not perpetuate a
dependency on aid. These are viable options for change.
In the future, another country will suffer from a natural disaster
and its devastating consequences. Before then, however, disaster
response efforts must be reconsidered and new plans implemented in
order to prevent relief efforts from exacerbating the devastating
circumstances and perpetuating a dependency on aid in the wake of
disaster. We cannot undo what has happened in Haiti since the
192. See Kumiko Makihara, supra note 158 (explaining and elaborating on the
implications of the magnitude of disaster in Japan after the 2011 earthquake and
subsequent tsunami); Martin Fackler & Matthew L. Wald, Life in Limbo for
Japanese Near Nuclear Plant, N.Y.
TIMES
(May
1, 2011),
www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/02japan.html (same); Wald, supra note
176 (same).
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earthquake, but by implementing these suggested policy changes, we
can prevent another country from reaching a similar state of
humanitarian disaster.
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